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The USA, the EU and the G-20 submitted proposals on domestic support in the WTO 
agriculture negotiations in October 2005. This research projects future support, 
allowances and constraints for the USA and the EU under these proposals. Accounting 
properly for the de minimis rules generates a “maximum usable components” 
constraint, which, even when added to the cap on blue, can be more constraining than 
the new overall commitment. The overall commitment under the U.S. proposal 
constrains neither the USA nor the EU in the future. However, the Overall commitment 
under the EU and G-20 proposals constrains both the USA and the EU to provide less 
future Overall Support than the sum of the cap on blue and maximum usable 
components. In general the three proposals are weak in constraining future distorting 
support in the USA and the EU. 
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Introduction 
he 2004 Framework Agreement on Agriculture that emerged from the Doha 
Round of WTO trade negotiations articulated many elements that together form 
the basis for the negotiations of modalities (WTO, 2004).
1 Members have since 
submitted proposals referring to the 2004 Framework. In particular, the USA, the EU 
and the G-20 submitted domestic support proposals in October 2005.
2 
This article reviews the major elements of the three proposals, examines key 
issues in assessing how they would constrain future distorting support, and introduces 
projections of future U.S. and EU support to estimate the severity of any constraints 
the proposals would impose on projected future U.S. and EU support. The term 
“AMS” (Aggregate Measurement of Support) is used here as defined in the 
Agreement on Agriculture (WTO, 1995), contrary to its use in many popular writings. 
Since the Agreement on Agriculture does not define “amber” support, and a variety of 
meanings are ascribed to the term in other writings, it is not used here. However, 
while the agreement does not define “green” or “blue” support, popular writings are 
quite uniform in what these terms mean: support that is exempt from Current Total 
AMS on grounds of meeting the criteria and conditions of Annex 2 and Art. 6.5, 
respectively. For an introduction to the categories of domestic support under the 
Agreement on Agriculture and to the constraints applying under that agreement and 
introduced in the 2004 Framework Agreement on Agriculture, the interested reader is 
referred to, for example, Blandford (2005) and Brink (2005). 
The October 2005 Domestic Support Proposals 
he elements of the proposals from the USA, the EU and the G-20 are outlined in 
table  1. These proposals are partly couched in conditional terms relating to 
progress in the negotiations outside the domestic support pillar. 
Total AMS 
The USA proposes harmonizing Total AMS reduction commitments at 83 percent, 60 
percent and 37 percent, depending on the size of the base (final bound Total AMS in 
Members’ schedules). This is called an 83/60/37 scenario. The EU proposes a 
70/60/50 scenario for reduction of Total AMS, and the G-20 proposes 80/70/60. The 
placement in tiers is the same for the three proposals, except that the EU places Japan 
either in the top tier, where the USA and G-20 proposals place Japan, or in the second 
tier but with a larger cut than that for other countries in that tier (Japan’s final bound 
Total AMS commitment ranks between those of the EU and the USA). 
T 
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Overall Reduction  
The Overall reduction refers to reducing “all trade-distorting domestic support”, or 
“Overall support” for brevity. Overall support encompasses all non-green support, i.e., 
all blue and AMS support (including de minimis AMSs). For the Overall reduction the 
three proposals also indicate identical placements in tiers, except that the EU proposal 
is not explicit about the placement of Japan. The Overall reduction scenarios proposed 
by the USA, the EU and the G-20 are, respectively, 75/53/31, 70/60/50 and 80/75/70. 
These reduction proposals lead to several observations. The EU proposal would apply 
the same reduction scenarios for Total AMS and Overall support, although the 2004 
Framework does not require this. In fact, because of how the base for the Overall 
reduction is calculated, relatively more slack will be built into the base for Overall 
reduction than will be built into the base for Total AMS reduction. This suggests that 
the percentage reduction in Overall support needs to be larger than the reduction in 
Total AMS. The G-20 proposal goes some way towards reducing Overall support by 
relatively more than Total AMS (80/75/70 vs. 80/70/60), but the difference between 
the scenarios is small. The U.S. proposal makes the Overall reductions (75/53/31) 
even smaller than the Total AMS reductions (83/60/37). This is contrary to the a priori 
expectation that Overall reductions, because of the larger built-in slack, would need to 
be relatively larger than Total AMS reductions. 
De Minimis  
On de minimis the proposals are, like the 2004 Framework, relatively vague on what it 
is that will be reduced (such as “de minimis cut by 50%” [U.S. proposal]) and “de 
minimis support should be reduced … by 80% ...” [EU proposal]). This is assumed to 
mean that the de minimis percentage of 5 percent, from Art. 6.4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, is to be reduced by 50 and 80 percent, respectively. Cutting 5 percent by 
50 and by 80 percent leaves 2.5 and 1 percent, respectively, under the U.S. and EU 
proposals (these percentages are applied to value of production to establish the de 
minimis allowances). The G-20 proposes that the reductions in de minimis “will be 
such to adjust to the rate of cut for the overall trade-distorting support [sic].” This is 
interpreted to mean that de minimis AMS support will be allowed only to the extent it 
can be accommodated, along with Current Total AMS and blue-box payments, within 
the overall commitment. The percentage cut can therefore not be determined in 
advance and will depend upon how much distorting support the country provides and 
in which form. 
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Table 1  Comparing the U.S., EU and G-20 October 2005 Proposals 
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Notes: Captures major changes from, or further specification of, elements of the 2004 Framework. 
Placement in tiers for harmonizing reductions of Total AMS and overall is based on data in World Trade 
Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, “Total Aggregate Measurement of Support” 
(TN/AG/S/13/Add.1; 28 February 2005), and “Total Value of Agricultural Production” (TN/AG/S/21; 4 
July 2005). G-20 refers to a group of 21 developing country Members of the WTO. For source references 
of the proposals, see Brink (2005). 
Cap on Blue  
Both the EU and the G-20 proposals keep the cap on blue payments at 5 percent of 
some historical value of production, as per the 2004 Framework. The USA would, 
however, reduce the percentage to 2.5 percent. The USA does not mention how it 
would pursue the additional criteria to be negotiated under the framework, while the 
EU and the G-20 propose limits on the ability of blue payments to offset price drops.   L. Brink 
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The G-20 also proposes product-specific caps on blue, while the EU rejects them. The 
G-20 proposal rules out the provision of blue payments for a product that receives 
more than de minimis AMS support and also rules out the classification of payments 
as blue if the production volume has increased. 
The following section examines key issues in assessing the constraints that would 
apply to distorting domestic support under the 2004 Framework and the proposals of 
the USA, the EU and the G-20. 
Consideration of the de Minimis Rules 
De Minimis Rules   
The effect of new domestic support constraints on countries’ ability to provide AMS 
support in the future is often discussed without considering how the de minimis rules 
work. The de minimis provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture are laid out in Art. 
6.4 (WTO, 1995). Art. 6.4(a) reads as follows:  
A Member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current 
Total AMS and shall not be required to reduce: 
(i) product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required 
to be included in a Member’s calculation of its Current AMS where such 
support does not exceed 5 per cent of that Member’s total value of 
production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year; and 
(ii) non-product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be 
required to be included in a Member’s calculation of its Current AMS 
where such support does not exceed 5 per cent of the value of that 
Member’s total agricultural production. 
Art. 6.4 uses terms such as “AMS” and “Current Total AMS”, which are defined in 
Art.1 of the agreement. There have been no suggestions that these articles would be 
changed, other than the percentage “5”. Observing the practices Members use to 
notify domestic support to the WTO Committee on Agriculture also informs the 
understanding of the de minimis rules. Enhanced monitoring and surveillance are 
foreseen in the 2004 Framework (para. 48), and no one has suggested any weakening 
of the present practices of claiming de minimis exemptions.   
Assessing how the proposals would constrain future AMS support without 
considering the de minimis rules gives estimates that deviate from the AMS support 
that will in fact be allowed. The present examination of two such deviations looks at 
the three AMS components of distorting domestic support: Current Total AMS, de 
minimis non-product-specific AMS, and the sum of de minimis product-specific   L. Brink 
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AMSs. It distinguishes between allowed support within the constraints (commitments 
or allowances) and current support that counts towards the constraints.  
Values of Production: Historical or Current 
he amount of AMS support that can be exempted from future values of Current 
Total AMS on de minimis grounds (de minimis allowance) is often estimated by 
applying a de minimis percentage to historical values of production, such as for the 
year 2001 or the year 2004. This deviates, however, from Art. 6.4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, which refers, at least in the case of product-specific de minimis AMSs, to 
the value of production “during the relevant year”. Moreover, the usual practice in 
notifying domestic support is to base de minimis claims on the value of production of 
the notified year, not a historical year. Estimating future de minimis allowances thus 
requires first estimating the value of production for a future year, such as 2014 (For 
the purposes of this research, the implementation of the Doha Round reductions is 
assumed to be complete in 2014).    
For countries with a rapidly growing value of production in agriculture, such as 
Brazil, the future amounts that may be exempted as de minimis AMS will be 
significantly larger than the corresponding amounts in 2001 or 2004. The value of 
production in U.S. agriculture may also grow considerably by 2014 (see the technical 
annex). The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 2014 projections indicate a value of 
production of around $260 billion, which is 30 percent larger than the approximately 
$200 billion usually assumed for recent years. The 2014 de minimis exemptions for 
the USA are thus likely to be 30 percent larger than in recent years, for any given de 
minimis percentage. 
Maximum Usable Components 
he allowed future amount of AMS support (support that is neither green nor blue) 
is sometimes estimated as the sum of the Total AMS commitment, the de minimis 
allowances for product-specific AMSs for all products, and the de minimis allowance 
for non-product-specific AMS. For example, assume that the future Total AMS 
commitment is $7.6 billion, and 2.5 percent of future value of production in the 
agriculture sector as a whole is $6.5 billion. The future sum of allowed AMS 
components would then be $7.6 + $6.5 + $6.5 = $20.6 billion (table 2 and figure 1). 
The $6.5 billion is counted once for the sum of all product-specific de minimis 
allowances and once for the non-product-specific de minimis allowance. 
However, because of how the de minimis rules work, the $20.6 billion in this 
example is an overestimate of what can actually be provided in the form of AMS 
T 
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support, whether de minimis or not. The following consideration of three extreme 
cases illustrates the root of the overestimation. The three extreme cases sum different 
combinations of the Total AMS commitment, de minimis allowances for product-
specific AMSs, and the de minimis allowance for non-product-specific AMS (see table 
2 and figure 1). 
1. Provide a non-product-specific AMS just up to the de minimis threshold ($6.5 
billion), and provide a product-specific AMS for each and every product in the 
agriculture sector just up to the product’s de minimis threshold (these AMSs 
thus sum to $6.5 billion). A total of $13 billion of AMS support is provided. The 
Current Total AMS has to be zero, since all AMSs are exempted as de minimis. 
The Total AMS commitment is unused ($7.6 billion). 
2. Provide a non-product-specific AMS just up to the de minimis threshold ($6.5 
billion), provide product-specific AMSs for each and every product in the 
agriculture sector in amounts that are larger than each product’s de minimis 
allowance and which sum to the Total AMS commitment. The Current Total 
AMS is equal to the Total AMS commitment, i.e., both the Total AMS 
commitment and the non-product-specific de minimis allowance are used to the 
hilt. A total of $6.5 + $7.6 = $14.1 billion is provided. The sum of the product-
specific de minimis allowances is unused ($6.5 billion). 
3. Provide a non-product-specific AMS just up to the de minimis threshold ($6.5 
billion), and provide product-specific AMSs for some products in amounts that 
are larger than their de minimis allowances and which add up to the Total AMS 
commitment. At the limit, one product-specific AMS would be concentrated on 
only one product with an infinitesimally small value of production. That 
product-specific AMS would be as large as the Total AMS commitment. This 
would allow product-specific AMSs to be provided for all the other products in 
the sector in amounts just up to their respective de minimis allowances. In 
practice, of course, product-specific AMSs larger than the de minimis 
allowances will be provided to real products with each product accounting for a 
significant share of the sector’s value of production. Assume for the purpose of 
this analysis that product-specific AMSs larger than each product’s de minimis 
allowance are provided to products accounting for one-half of the sector’s value 
of production. Current Total AMS is then $6.5 + $7.6 + $3.3 billion, which 
equals $17.4 billion. 
The example is illustrated in table 2 and figure 1. The full sum of the components 
is $20.6 billion. In case 1 the Total AMS commitment is not used at all, but all de 
minimis allowances, whether product-specific or non-product-specific, are fully used   L. Brink 
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and sum to $13 billion. In case 2 the fully used Total AMS commitment is larger than 
the (unused) sum of product-specific de minimis allowances, and support adds to 
$14.1 billion. Finally, in case 3 the usable components sum to $17.4 billion. 
The point of this discussion is to demonstrate that at least one of the three AMS 
components is, either in full or in part, never usable. The usable sum of the AMS 
components is always less than the full sum of the three AMS components. Intuitively 
this is explained as “an AMS cannot at the same time be de minimis and part of 
Current Total AMS.” Call this usable sum “maximum usable components” (MUC). 
 
 
Figure 1  Calculating Maximum Usable Components (MUC)   L. Brink 
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Table 2  Illustrating the Calculation of Maximum Usable Components (MUC) 
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specific AMSs for rice and milk. Similar changes are possible for the products for 
which the USA reports significant product-specific AMSs (dairy and sugar). Such 
decisions would make the past distribution of product-specific AMSs largely 
irrelevant for estimating the future distribution. 
If a split of one-third and two-thirds were assumed instead of the one-half and 
one-half, Current Total AMS would consist of product-specific AMSs for products 
that account for one-third of the sector’s value of production, and the product-specific 
de minimis allowances for products accounting for the other two-thirds of the sector 
would be fully “used”. This would generate $18.4 billion as the sum of usable 
components. It is also possible to devise differently structured examples, where a 
Member’s Total AMS commitment is much smaller than the sum of the product-
specific de minimis allowances, contrary to the $7.6 vs. $6.5 billion of this example. 
Argentina is an example of such a situation.          
Assessing the Constraints on Future Support 
he constraints on future support are determined not only by the fixed ceilings 
resulting from ceiling commitments on Total AMS, Overall Support and blue 
support; in addition, the de minimis allowances are important in constraining the 
future AMS support. The future de minimis allowances are calculated from fixed 
percentages of future values of production. Assessing the constraints imposed under 
the proposals of the USA, the EU and the G-20 thus requires projecting not only 
future amounts of support in the different categories subject to constraint but also 
projecting the future values of production. The projections of support and values of 
production for the USA and the EU in 2014 are shown in the technical annex to this 
article. The annex also presents the calculation of the 2014 constraints, including the 
MUC. Comparing the projected support against the constraints leads to conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the three proposals in constraining future distorting U.S. 
and EU support. 
For the USA, the reduced Total AMS commitment by itself under either the U.S. 
or the EU proposal will not be low enough to constrain projected 2014 Current Total 
AMS, whereas the Total AMS commitment under the G-20 proposal is low enough to 
be a constraint. For the EU, the reduced Total AMS commitment under both the U.S. 
proposal and the G-20 proposal will be low enough to constrain projected 2014 
Current Total AMS. The EU proposal would not reduce the EU 2014 Total AMS 
commitment enough to constrain Current Total AMS.
3 
The overall commitment of the U.S. proposal will not be a binding constraint on 
the sum of blue and AMS support for either the USA or the EU (under the baseline 
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projections for prices and quantities that underlie this analysis). Instead the (smaller) 
sum of the blue cap and MUC will be binding. If future values of production were 
lower than projected, the future de minimis allowances would also be smaller, making 
the sum of the blue cap and MUC even smaller and reinforcing the role of this 
constraint. Under the EU and the G-20 proposals the overall commitment would be 
the binding constraint on the sum of blue and AMS support for both the USA and the 
EU. If the future value of production were significantly smaller than projected, the 
sum of the blue cap and MUC would be the binding constraint on the sum of blue and 
AMS support. 
While the G-20 proposal does not specify a particular reduction of the de minimis 
percentage, the depth of cut in the overall commitment is large enough to imply the 
elimination of de minimis allowances for both the USA and the EU, i.e., reducing the 
de minimis percentage from 5 percent to zero. Even with this elimination of the de 
minimis allowances under the G-20 proposal, the sum of the blue cap and the Total 
AMS commitment is larger than the overall commitment for the USA and the EU. 
This means that the G-20 proposal will prevent the USA and the EU from fully using 
either blue payments up to the blue cap or AMS support up to the Total AMS 
commitment, or both. 
Conclusions  
he proposals submitted in October 2005 by the USA, the EU and the G-20 differ 
significantly in key features that would determine future constraints on distorting 
domestic support, such as the reduction percentages for Total AMS and Overall 
Support, the reductions of de minimis percentages, and the size of the cap on blue. 
Estimating the effectiveness of the future constraints in constraining future support, 
while taking account of the de minimis rules of the Agreement on Agriculture, requires 
projections of future values of production. This is important if the future values of 
production are expected to differ significantly from historical values, which may be 
the case for the USA and the EU. 
The de minimis rules also require going beyond calculating simply the full sum of 
the allowed components of AMS support (Total AMS commitment, non-product-
specific de minimis AMS allowance, and the sum of product-specific de minimis AMS 
allowances). The analysis needs to consider the sum of allowed AMS components, 
accounting for the fact that an AMS cannot at the same time be de minimis and be part 
of Current Total AMS. This sum is called maximum usable components (MUC). The 
future difference between the full sum of components of AMS support and the MUC 
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may amount to one or a few billion dollars or euros for the USA and the EU, which 
can be significant in evaluating the future constraints. 
The overall commitment resulting from the U.S. proposal is so large that it is not a 
binding constraint on either the USA or the EU. The MUC is smaller and is therefore 
the effective constraint on Overall Support. However, both the EU proposal and 
especially the G-20 proposal constrain Overall Support to be smaller than MUC for 
both the USA and the EU. 
The EU proposal does not constrain any of the measurements of applied 2014 
support, in either the USA or the EU (Current Total AMS, current Overall Support, 
sum of applied AMSs and blue support). The U.S. proposal is almost as ineffective in 
constraining 2014 applied support, but it does constrain EU 2014 Current Total AMS. 
The G-20 proposal is somewhat more effective – it constrains all three measurements 
of 2014 EU support, yet only the 2014 Current Total AMS for the USA. Altogether the 
three October 2005 proposals show seemingly large percentage reductions in the 
constraints applying to future distorting domestic support, but the effectiveness of 
these constraints is found to be weak. 
   L. Brink 
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*    Any policy views, whether explicitly stated, inferred or interpreted from the 
contents of this paper, should not be represented as reflecting the views of 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. 
1.   In the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which resulted from the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations, Members agreed that negotiations would be initiated to continue 
the reform process. In November 2001 Members launched a new, broadly based 
round of multilateral trade negotiations known as the Doha Development Agenda. 
It incorporated the agriculture negotiations, which had been launched in 2000. 
Following a conference in 2003, where Members were unable to reach agreement 
on key issues, Members intensified their efforts. They achieved an important 
milestone in July 2004, when they reached agreement on a framework for the 
agriculture negotiations. It proposed concepts and approaches to guide negotiators 
in working toward a package of modalities (i.e., detailed rules and formulas for 
taking commitments) in the three main areas of the negotiations, namely export 
competition, market access and domestic support.    
2.   In October 2005 the G-20 group appears to have comprised the following 21 
developing country Members of the WTO: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela 
and Zimbabwe. 
3.   While this analysis addresses future constraints, it should be noted that the future 
Total AMS commitments of both the USA and the EU under all three proposals 
are smaller than the respective estimated Current Total AMS in 2004 (the 
estimates of 2004 Current Total AMS shown in Figures 2 and 3 are based on data 
in Brink (2005)). If the proposed future Total AMS commitments had been in 
place in 2004, both the USA and the EU would have been constrained from 
providing as much Total AMS support as they provided in 2004. 
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